it.
Huber claims that "unscrupulous" lawyers have long made healthy livings by using expert witnesses to fabricate causes of action. For example, he describes a recent case in which expert testimony was used to argue that a plaintiff's subjection to a CAT scan harmed her psychic abilities (p. 4). When plaintiffs' attorneys offer such scientifically unsupportable evidence against deep-pocket defendants, juries often find in the plaintiffs' favor, regardless of the evidence's integrity. Indeed, in the case of the CAT scan, the jury awarded the plaintiff roughly one million dollars, although the decision was subsequently overruled.
Perhaps jury awards based on junk science are attributable to the human 1. Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. 2. See, e.g., W. JohnMoore, Knocking the System, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23, 1991 Nov. 23, , at 2844 (discussing a speech that Vice President Quayle delivered to the litigation section of the American Bar Association).
3. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO' S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 0990. 12. See "/lcCarthy, supra note I1, at 386. 13. The traumatic cancer cases Huber describes were those in which victims were injured by defendants in a certain part of their body and later developed cancer in that same area.
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[Vol. 6 "traumatic cancer." Huber offers two explanations why "so many judges [goq it so wrong in so many cases spanning so many years" (p. 45). First, some judges may have actually believed in "traumatic cancer," and thus were following the doctrine of in dubio pro laeso ~4 (p. 45) . The decisions favoring the victim were also tolerated because judges and juries may have found it difficult to feel sympathetic towards a deep-pocket defendant who could easily cover the victims' expenses.
Unfortunately, successful junk science is hardly limited to the past, and
Huber analyzes the toll exacted by evidence based on poor scientific methodology in several modern in3tances. He cites the case of the Audi 5000 with its alleged propensity to accelerate out of the driver's control even when the driver had his or her foot firmly on the brake (pp. 60-61).
The sudden acceleration was a mystery at the time because in almost all of the cases the b.-'akes were found to be functioning normally after the ensuing accident. In numerous suits filed agah~st Audi, plaintiffs' attorneys and "experts" postulated theories for the sudden acceleration, the most popular including electronic failure of the cruise control, defects in the accelerator linkage, and transmission pressure problems. In response to these allegations, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA') investigated the Audi 5000 and four other cars to determine the cause of the mysterious sudden acceleration.
NHTSA reported that no vehicle malfunction was evident, concluding that the accidents were probably the result of the plaintiffs' pedal misapplications. In short, the sudden accelerations were due to driver error, not to the Audi 5000. Unfortunately, NHTSA's report came after Audi had settled many cases and lost a few. Thus, the Audi experience demonstrates that speculation on the part of so-called experts and the admission of their speculation as evidence can lead some courts to fred liability where there is arguably none. Huber also describes some of the negative externalities resulting from these decisions: The negative publicity that Audi received as a result of the lawsuits caused its sales in the United States to plummet by over forty-six percent (p. 74).
In another illustration of the costs of junk science, Huber discusses the Bendectin cases. In 1983, Bendectin was taken off the market by its manufacturer, Merrel Dow, after it became party to numerous suits alleging that Bendectin caused birth defects in babies whose mothers had 14. When in doubt favor the injured. 
